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A COMMENT ON CASS SUNSTEIN'S 
EQUALITY 
Emily Sherwin* 
(with annotations by Larry Alexander**) 
In an article entitled Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With 
Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion and Surrogacy), 1 Profes-
sor Cass Sunstein has proposed that judges should give up the 
search for neutral principles in favor of a truer form of equal protec-
tion, in which law is partial to historically disadvantaged groups. 
This line of argument is not new-it is a major theme in contempo-
rary legal writing-but Sunstein has stated it with particular clarity. 
My purpose in this paper is to examine Sunstein's approach to con-
stitutional law to see where it leads and what sort of government it 
entails. 
Sunstein begins by arguing that it is false to conceive equal pro-
tection of law as an evenhanded application of neutral principles. 
Seemingly neutral principles work from a "baseline" of social ad-
vantages ("wealth, opportunities, preferences and natural endow-
ments"), which are unevenly distributed among the different groups 
that make up society.2 Law not only accepts this baseline, but also 
shapes and perpetuates it.3 
It follows, for Sunstein, that law should be partisan rather than 
neutral.4 Under the authority of the Equal Protection clause, 
courts should identify and rectify group disadvantages previously 
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I. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Por-
nography. Abortion and Surrogacy), 92 Colum. L. Rev. I (1992). 
2. ld. at 1-2, 5-13. 
3. See id. at 9. 
4. See id. at 15-18, 48. 
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tolerated (and therefore condoned) by law.s Equal protection of 
law means rooting out "constitutionally unacceptable stereotypes" 
imbedded in the baseline of present society.6 
Sunstein applies his ideas to three specific issues: pornography, 
abortion, and surrogate motherhood contracts. In each of these ar-
eas, Sunstein detects an inequality in "the sexual and reproductive 
status quo" that ought to be corrected in the interest of equality for 
women. 7 He concludes that a right to abortion is good for women 
and should be recognized, while pornography and surrogacy are 
bad for women and should (perhaps) be banned.s 
I accept Sunstein's initial point, that law is not neutral in the 
sense that it is indifferent among possible distributions of wealth 
and advantage. Law protects a set of entitlements and a sphere of 
private choice that determine the economic and social positions of 
individuals.9 I agree, too, that the existing distribution of advan-
tages is not equal, not fair according to any articulable standard of 
fairness, and not what we might fix on if we started from scratch. 
Nevertheless, there is much to be said for an ideal of law that ap-
plies impartially to existing social facts-if only in comparison with 
the partisan alternative Sunstein recommends. 
In a footnote early in his article, Sunstein mentions several 
writers who have defended the accumulated wisdom of the existing 
social order.to Among them he lists Edmund Burke (as if to say 
"some at the fringe might think this"). Now I am not ready to 
accept the complete political philosophy of Edmund Burke. But 
5. I believe this is what Sunstein means when he suggests that a proper understanding 
of equal protection takes account of the "causes and effects of legal controls.·· See id. at 49. 
6. See, e.g., id. at 32. 
7. Id. at 16, 17, 49. 
8. See id. at 16-17, 26-27, 39-40, 47-48, 49-50. Sunstein takes a definite position on 
abortion, but is more equivocal with respect to pornography and surrogacy. See id. at 50. On 
these latter issues, he maintains that there are valid equal protection arguments in favor of 
regulation, but adds that the arguments from equality may be outweighed by other considera-
tions. See id. at 26-27, 47-48, 49-50. 
9. On neutrality, see, e.g., Larry Alexander and Paul Horton, Whom Does the Consti-
tution Command?: A Conceptual Analysis with Practical Considerations 74-79 (Greenwood 
Press, 1988). 
This point is not new. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 
(1987). Further, as Sunstein himself recognizes, the point is analytical, and has no normative 
force of its own. See Sunstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 12 n.40 (cited in note 1). To point out 
that there is no neutral baseline of entitlements and that all entitlements are backed by state 
action does not make the case for or against any particular baseline, whether as a matter of 
equal protection or as a matter of freedom of speech. On baselines and freedom of speech, 
compare Sunstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 10-11 (baseline distribution of wealth affects distri-
bution of speech) with Lawrence Alexander and Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free 
Speech Principle, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1319, 1344, 1348 (1983) (same). [L.A.] 
10. Sunstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 3-4 n.8 (cited in note 1). 
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Burke said some wise things, which Sunstein might consider as he 
prepares to remake society. 
Commenting on the social reformers of his own time (those 
who urged England to follow France in revolution), Burke said: 
These professors . . . [f]inding their schemes of politics not 
adapted to the state of the world in which they live, ... come to 
think lightly of all public principle; and are ready, on their part, 
to abandon for a very trivial interest what they find of very trivial 
value.t 1 
I will return to Burke, but first let me spell out the type of reform 
that Sunstein seems to have in mind. 
At first glance, one might think that Sunstein is objecting to 
the very idea of a baseline-that is, to the fact that law works from 
a baseline of social and economic advantages. Once this baseline is 
revealed, law cannot claim to be neutral, or to treat its subjects 
equally. 
But on more careful inspection, I do not think Sunstein is ob-
jecting to the existence of a baseline; his quarrel is with the present 
baseline. Indeed, no system claiming to be a system of law could 
operate apart from a baseline of advantages and disadvantages. The 
point of law is to establish a social order, to fix the rules of the 
game, to secure the goods of the world to individuals by some other 
means than force. The moment there is law, there is a baseline, and 
in the absence of a baseline, there is anarchy. And it would be an 
error to think that Sunstein is advocating anarchy. In fact, he is 
advocating a very definite-and very strict-social order. 
Sunstein's point, then, is not to do away with baselines, but to 
move us from the present unjust distribution of advantages to a 
new, true, unbiased baseline.12 Sunstein proposes to revise the base-
line by tracing and eradicating the "causes and effects of legal con-
trols" in present society.t3 The first step is to examine the history of 
asserted legal inequalities, in order to determine whether suppos-
edly neutral laws have reinforced disadvantages in the underlying 
social baseline.t 4 If so, lawmakers should act to rectify those disad-
vantages by overriding tainted entitlements and preferences. 
II. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 155 ( 1790; reprinted by 
Penguin Books, 1976) ("Reflections"). 
12. See Sunstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 52 (suggesting that "decisions made in accord-
ance with the appropriate baseline" would embody a proper form of neutrality) (cited in note 
1). 
13. ld. at 49. 
14. See id. at 13-18,49. Sunstein states, for example, that "the sexual and reproductive 
status quo is sometimes a locus of unjustified inequality, and the law should protect against 
that inequality." I d. at 49. 
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Sunstein's reference to cause and effect suggests that he is ad-
vancing a "neutral" principle of his own. At least, he is attempting 
to locate his baseline by objective methods. He will study history, 
discover the legal "causes and effects" of inequality, and act to es-
tablish a correct baseline. 
But is his inquiry really an objective one that can yield a truer 
baseline? To anyone familiar with tort law, the word "cause" will 
stand out immediately as a red flag. Any event or condition has 
multiple causes,Is and identifying one of them as the responsible 
cause is inevitably a normative process. 
Any remaining semblance of objectivity disappears when one 
considers that the thing caused, in his formula, is inequality. Before 
Sunstein can trace out the causes of inequality, he must decide who 
is now unequal and how unequal they are.I6 If the issue were sim-
ply one of wealth distribution, identifying inequalities would be a 
relatively straightforward task.I7 But Sunstein is concerned with 
the distribution of social advantages-with matters such as status 
and role. Moreover, he is concerned not only with equality among 
individuals, but also (and more emphatically) with equality among 
groups. In his own terminology, he is concerned with problems of 
caste .1 s In a society such as ours, the boundaries of castes, as well 
as their relative rank, are surely controversial questions.I9 
Thus it turns out that Sunstein's baseline is not something he 
15. If someone left embers burning in a campfire, and an extraordinary gust of wind 
blew them into a distant patch of brush, where lay a gasoline can carelessly forgotten by 
someone else, and a forest fire followed, what caused the fire? See Hart and Honore, Causa-
tion and Responsibility, in H. L.A. Hart and Tony Honore, Causation in the Law ch. 3, 62-83 
(Clarendon Press, 2d ed. 1985). For an example of the difficulty of working out a natural 
understanding of causation, see Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal 
Stud. 151, 160-89 (1973). 
16. Peter Westen points out that there are at least seven possible interpretations of 
"equality before the law." Peter Westen, Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the Rhetorical 
Force of 'Equality' in Moral and Legal Discourse, 74-79 (Princeton U. Press, 1990). It may 
mean that legal classifications (whatever their content) must be applied consistently; or that 
no person shall be classified in a way that leaves him or her outside the reach or protection of 
law; or that all are entitled to a fair judicial hearing; or that laws must not be applied retroac-
tively; or that courts should be open to all without regard to ability to pay; or that the law 
must not make arbitrary classifications; or that the law must not distinguish among people on 
any basis. ld. at 76-77. 
17. Even in the context of wealth, the meaning of equality is contestable. For example, 
equality can plausibly be understood as either numerical equivalence or distribution in pro-
portion to some criterion of merit. See id. at 52-57 (on Aristotle and proportional equality). 
18. Sunstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 15 n.56 (cited in note 1). 
19. Sunstein has chosen to focus on a particular group, women. But he never answers 
the fundamental question why we should care how certain biological or vaguely sociological 
groups, such as women, are faring as groups. What gives these groups moral significance' 
How do a black mother on welfare, a wealthy Palm Beach matron, a moderately successful 
woman lawyer, and a middle class housewife constitute a group whose group prospects are 
morally significant? Why don't we care about groups such as the unskilled, or the poorly 
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can arrive at neutrally, empirically, or uncontroversially. The 
"causes and effects of legal controls" are only a feint, and his analy-
sis is entirely prescriptive. Stripped of the language of cause and 
effect, Sunstein's argument must be that we should reject a baseline 
shaped by past history and social evolution in favor of a baseline 
that enacts Sunstein's view of correct social order. 
The contours of Sunstein's program are rather obscure. We 
know what he requires in three specific areas (pornography, abor-
tion, and surrogacy). Otherwise, he describes his program as "anti-
caste" and grounded in "equality," but the only guide he gives us to 
interpreting those terms is the unhelpful notion of cause and effect. 
But suppose Sunstein has a social vision. Perhaps he has 
worked out a conception of the minimum dignity and welfare to 
which all individuals are entitled. Or (more in keeping with the 
notion of caste), he may have a conception of the minimum dignity 
and welfare that must not be denied to any identifiable group.2o 
If Sunstein is going to do away with the present baseline and 
reenact it according to some such ideal, he faces a serious problem 
of central planning. Laws must be partial (he says). But in design-
ing partial laws, just what do we give to whom in order to achieve 
the right end resuJt?2t In economic affairs, central designs have not 
paid? Why abstract this one commonality (female) from every difference and deem it morally 
significant? 
Sunstein refers obliquely to "politically vulnerable" groups (Sunstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 
at 41 (cited in note I)); but political vulnerability does not explain his aggregation of women. 
If anything, the groups he is concerned with are those that have managed to draw political 
attention to themselves as groups. [L.A.) 
20. It is not enough to say that in a society dominated by "white male" values, we must 
improve the relative positions of others. To argue effectively against a set of values that 
results in a certain pattern of power, reward, and adulation, one must argue that another set 
of values-which favors a different group of people-is better. Thus Sunstein must show that 
laws redesigned to favor groups such as women, racial minorities, or the disabled will be 
superior to current laws in terms of what people want (or should want?). For example, we 
might improve the relative position of the learning disabled by returning to a primitive agri-
cultural society. But the standard of living would be dismal, and the absolute position of all 
people (including the disabled) would be lowered. (L.A.) 
Sunstein hints at something like an (oxymoronic) unconscious conspiracy among white 
males to preserve the current values that favor them. We see these interests as neutral and 
natural when they are not, and this (he suggests) serves the interests of white males. But 
many white males do poorly by prevailing standards, and many females and non-whites do 
well. It seems more plausible, then, that the prevailing values seem neutral and natural-that 
they are invisible-not because they favor white males, but because they produce what most 
of us want. (L.A.) 
21. It may be possible to arrive at a conception of distributive justice by a method such 
as John Rawls has described. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 11-22 (Belknap Press, 
1971) ("the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests 
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their 
association"). But Rawls himself admitted that his theory is designed to test the "basic struc-
ture of society," see id. at 7-11, rather than to resolve specific disputes such as the legality of 
abortion or pornography. 
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been successful-recent history suggests that the market does a bet-
ter job of generating, collating and applying information than a cen-
tral authority.22 Sunstein's project is the far greater one of social 
central planning, which lacks even the common denominator of 
currency. As Burke reminded the revolutionists: 
The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating 
it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not 
to be taught d priori. Nor is it a short experience that can in-
struct us in that practical science; because the real effects of 
moral causes are not always immediate . . . [V]ery plausible 
schemes, with very pleasing commencements, have often shame-
ful and lamentable conclusions. . . . The science of government 
being ... a matter which requires experience, and even more 
experience than any person can gain in his whole life, ... it is 
with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling 
down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for 
ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, 
without having models and patterns of approved utility before 
his eyes.23 
The best evidence of the difficulty of designing a new social 
order is Sunstein's own endeavor to improve (or correct) the status 
of women, through changes in laws relating to pornography, abor-
tion, and surrogacy. In the area of pornography, he finds that mate-
rial depicting violent acts against women encourages a form of 
violence that disproportionately affects women, and that it fosters a 
"degrading and dehumanizing" view of women.24 Thus the princi-
ple of equal protection supports a ban on pomography.25 In the 
area of abortion, he finds that restrictions on abortion result in 
22. See Christopher T. Won nell, The Abstract Character of Contract Law, 22 Conn. L. 
Rev. 437, 456-57 (1990). 
23. Burke, Reflections at 152 (cited in note II). 
24. Sunstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 20-26 (cited in note 1). In the course of his discus-
sion of pornography, Sunstein cites but mischaracterizes a previous article by one of the 
authors of this paper. See id. at 22 n.88, referring to Larry Alexander, Legal Theory: Low 
Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 551-54 (1989). The point made in that article was that 
the government cannot claim that it is justified in regulating pornography because of the 
political content of its message (that is, its implicit comment on the status and worth of 
women) and at the same time maintain that pornography does not qualify as high value, 
political speech. If the message received is political (as Sunstein suggests it is), the speaker's 
intent is irrelevant. If, on the other hand, no such political message is received, the political 
value of the speech is diminished, but so is the government's justification for banning it. 
[L.A.] 
Sunstein also avoids dealing with the problem that bad images of women-images con-
ducive to violence and inequality-are conveyed by a substantial body of material generally 
acknowledged as literature or art. [L.A.] 
25. I d. at 26-27. 
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"bodily cooptation"26 of women in support of fetuses, and perpetu-
ate a stereotypical association of women with childbearing.21 Laws 
restricting abortion prescribe "different roles for men and women 
... that are part of second-class citizenship for women. "2s It fol-
lows that such laws are constitutionally unsound.29 In the area of 
surrogate motherhood, Sunstein finds that if we uphold surrogacy 
arrangements "the reproductive capacities of one class of people are 
turned, by law, into something for the use of others."Jo Moreover, 
the "social legitimation" of surrogacy would confirm a historically 
subservient role for women.Jt Therefore surrogacy contracts, too, 
are constitutionally suspect.J2 
In resolving these issues, Sunstein is prepared to override or 
discount a particular woman's decision (such as the decision to 
enter into a surrogate motherhood contract, or the decision to risk 
pregnancy) in the interest of dignity and equality for women.33 As 
he puts it, his understanding of liberty "does not entail respect for 
all 'choices,' viewed acontextually and made pursuant to existing 
distributions of wealth and entitlements. "34 
But hasn't Sunstein overlooked something? Doesn't the legal 
validity of women's choices (identified particularly as women's 
choices) have something to do with the view the world takes of wo-
men? Is it not "degrading and dehumanizing" to say women do not 
26. ld. at 31-32, 42. 
27. ld. at 31-44. 
28. ld. at 36. 
29. ld. at 32, 39, 40, 43-44. 
30. ld. at 45. 
31. I d. at 46. Virtually any restriction on freedom could be justified in this way, by 
arguing that the activity in question affects social attitudes about those who engage in it. 
[L.A.] 
32. ld. at 47-48. 
33. See id. at 45 (acknowledging that regulation of surrogacy contracts would override 
voluntary agreements), 41 (suggesting that a woman who voluntarily engages in sex should 
not be considered to assume risk of pregnancy). 
34. ld. at 17. The endogeneity of preferences (relative to a set of entitlements) is a 
frequent theme in Sunstein's writing. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with 
Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129 (1986). But its implications are unclear. If the 
entitlements to which preferences are endogenous are morally correct, then the preferences 
should be respected. If the entitlements are not morally correct, then it is the entitlements 
that should be changed, and if the preferences are truly endogenous, they will change with 
them. Either way, one must attack or defend the entitlements, rather than the preferences. 
[L.A.] 
Perhaps, then, the question is whether entitlements can be justified by reference to ex-
isting preferences. The argument of endogeneity suggests that they cannot; but this leads to 
further problems. If all preferences are endogenous, one cannot simply argue against respect-
ing a particular set of preferences. Instead, one must either reject all reliance on prefer-
ences-which suggests a very strong paternalism, stronger perhaps than even Sunstein would 
endorse; or one must argue about true, authentic-self preferences, which suggests pretty much 
the same thing. [L.A.] 
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understand their own interests? To me, Sunstein's version of dig-
nity and equality is an odd and dangerous one, for it suggests that 
women are not fully autonomous beings-that they are so disabled 
by a history of discrimination that they require the assistance of 
Sunstein in ordering their lives.Js But then I am just a woman, 
probably awash in false consciousness (or as Sunstein might say, 
endogenous preferences). Burke said of the reformers of his time: 
You will smile here at the consistency of those democratists, 
who, when they are not on their guard, treat the humbler part of 
the community with the greatest contempt, whilst, at the same 
time, they pretend to make them the depositories of all power.36 
If it appears that Sunstein has arrived at his conclusions by a 
full and fair review of the evidence, then perhaps I should abide by 
his results and wait for my status to improve. But I cannot give him 
much credit for scientific method. He cites empirical data, but the 
data are curiously one-sided. Overall, his tone is one of advocacy 
rather than impartial review of facts. 
In fact, it seems at times that Sunstein's enthusiasm for his en-
terprise has got the better of his common sense. For example, is it 
really fair to assume (as Sunstein does at a crucial point in his dis-
cussion of abortion) that "an abortion is seen as a killing rather than 
a failure to allow conscription only because of the perceived natu-
ralness of the role of women as child-bearers"?37 One might just as 
35. One troubling aspect of the argument from endogeneity is that it assumes that Sun-
stein himself has somehow escaped the corrupting influence of existing distributions of advan-
tages (or that he can penetrate it by sheer force of intellect). Otherwise, how could we accept 
any conclusion he draws about the preferences of others? 
36. Burke, Reflections at 146 (cited in note 11). 
37. Sunstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 35 (cited in note 1). Sunstein is not alone in this 
thought. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion 
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 360 (1992): "Rather, one 
has to ask, in what ways might assumptions about the proper roles of men and women have 
moved the state to engage in fetal life-saving by compelling pregnancy?" How else would the 
state go about fetal life-saving? [L.A.] 
In fact, the entire argument that abortion is an issue of equal protection for women is 
implausible. Sunstein objects that current Supreme Court doctrine takes the "physical capac-
ities of men" as its baseline, and so does not recognize abortion restrictions as a form of 
discrimination. It is true, of course, that men and women differ in their capacity to become 
pregnant, and it is true that the manner in which the law responds to that difference is a 
matter of choice. But it is a distraction to focus on the fact that lawmakers have a choice 
rather than on the justifiability of the choice they make. In the end, until technology makes 
ex utero gestation possible, if the fetus is morally and legally protectable, initial bodily care by 
women is the only eligible choice. [L.A.] 
Sunstein also argues that sex-specific legislation is "sex discrimination" (at least when it 
affects the vulnerable group, women). See Sunstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 32-37 (cited in note 
I). But the debate over whether laws relating to pregnancy are "sex discrimination" or only 
discrimination between "persons who become pregnant" and those who do not is a red her-
ring. Whether a law is or is not sex discrimination depends on (I) whether it was motivated 
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well argue that abortion should not be allowed because a right to 
abort pregnancies confirms a traditional view of women as fickle 
and unable to manage their affairs. Or, similarly, one might argue 
that surrogacy contracts should be allowed in order to counteract 
the negative effects of past laws denying contractual capacity to 
married women. 
Another example is Sunstein's assessment of a New Republic 
article entitled Big Boobs: Ed Meese and His Pornography Commis-
sion. Sunstein explains that the magazine "sought, in this way, to 
ridicule the authors of the Report by depicting them as parts of the 
female anatomy .... [Thus it] inadvertently confirmed some of the 
antipornography movement's arguments about the relationships 
among sexuality, pornography, and inequality."Js Others might 
have interpreted the same title as a play on words-a joke. But 
then modem legal scholarship is not much inclined to levity. 
In the end, I can only think that Sunstein's efforts on behalf of 
my gender are ill-conceived and likely to do more harm than good. 
This is not to say that I disagree in all cases with his results. For 
example, I would be happy to see abortion established more se-
curely as an individual right. But I deeply mistrust his methods. I 
have far more confidence in a legal system that works from the ex-
isting baseline, evolved over time through human interaction in an 
open society, then I would in a system given over to Sunstein for 
revision. 
There is also a problem of enforcement. Sunstein admits (in 
fact, he insists) that the baseline of social and economic advantages 
he wishes to enact is not supported by present social consensus.39 
Nor does he envision a system in which individuals are free to 
choose which values to pursue.40 
Without the support of either consensus or rational self-inter-
est, Sunstein must be prepared to take the measures necessary to 
bring unwilling subjects (me, for example) into compliance with his 
laws. Sanctions are a necessary part of any legal system, because no 
system can hope for the willing obedience of all its subjects in all 
cases.4 I But the system will be more stable, and have less cause to 
by bias or unwarranted stereotypes, or (2) perhaps, for those like Sunstein who find this 
material, whether it produces group inequality. In the latter case, why not just say that sex-
specific legislation will hurt women as a group, whatever that means? On suspects that the 
term "sex-specific" functions to allow the latter form of such a claim to trade on the general 
antipathy toward the former one. (L.A.] 
38. Sunstein, 92 Colum. L. Rev. at 25 n.98 (cited in note I). 
39. See, e.g., id. at 28-29. 
40. See id. at 17. Sunstein's disregard for individual choice among values is particularly 
evident in his discussion of surrogacy contracts. See id. at 46-47. 
41. This is true simply because law must (to some extent) take the form of general rules. 
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employ sanctions, if most of its subjects think the laws it enacts are 
sensible.42 To command voluntary respect, the law must appeal not 
only to a few academics who share an understanding of equality, 
but to the whole mass of people who live under it. This suggests 
that Sunstein's program might require somewhat more in the way 
of enforcement than we have become accustomed to in our present, 
non-ideal society. 
Burke believed in the wisdom of the existing social baseline, 
and in "the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the human intel-
lect, which, with all its defects, redundancies, and errors, is the col-
lected reason of ages."43 And he feared the destruction that can 
result from programs that seek to force radical change on an unwill-
ing society: 
Rage and phrenzy will pull down more in half an hour, than 
prudence, deliberation, and foresight can build up in a hundred 
years. The errors and defects of old establishments are visible 
and palpable. It calls for little ability to point them out; and 
where absolute power is given, it requires but a word wholly to 
abolish the vice and the establishment together.44 
At least in academic literature, rage and frenzy have received 
more attention lately than they are due. Our democratic order, in 
which individuals are equal in moral and political status if not in 
social advantage, is much more deserving of respect than the order 
Burke wished to defend. The fact is that we live in a prosperous, 
heterogenous society, under sound institutions that accommodate 
and protect a wide plurality of views. We have the machinery nec-
essary for constructive social change through public debate.4s We 
should trust in our institutions. We should support the right of 
speech. We should let matters like proper roles for women work 
themselves out-without the assistance of Sunstein's "partisan" 
laws. 
Any general rule, no matter how wise and good, will at sometimes conflict with a rational 
assessment of right action in an individual case. See Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 Harv. J. 
L. & Pub. Pol. 695 (1991 ); Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 Ethics 315, 
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